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ATTORNEY’S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES—   
OCTOBER 2009 TERM 
Martin A. Schwartz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the October 2009 Term, the Supreme Court decided an im-
portant case concerning statutory attorney’s fees in civil rights cases.1  
This decision will directly impact the determination of fee applica-
tions in federal civil rights cases.   
About thirty-five years ago, Congress determined that the ef-
fective enforcement of federal civil rights statutes is largely depen-
dent upon private parties bringing lawsuits to enforce their rights un-
der civil rights provisions.2  At the same time, Congress understood 
that private parties frequently do not have the funds to hire private at-
torneys to bring civil rights actions.3  As a result, Congress over the 
years enacted various fee-shifting statutes, which authorize a court to 
* Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. B.B.A., cum laude, 1966, City College of New York; 
J.D., magna cum laude, 1968, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1973, New York University 
School of Law.  Professor Schwartz has authored leading treatises including Section 1983 
Litigation: Claims and Defenses (4th ed. 2004-2006), Section 1983 Litigation: Federal Evi-
dence (4th ed. 2007) and Section 1983 Litigation: Jury Instructions (2007).  He is co-author 
of Section 1983 Litigation: Statutory Attorney’s Fees (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2011).  Professor 
Schwartz is also the author of a bi-monthly column for the New York Law Journal entitled 
“Public Interest Law.”  He is lead author of Section 1983 Litigation, Second Edition (Federal 
Judicial Center 2008).  He chairs the Practising Law Institute’s annual program on Section 
1983 litigation and Trial Evidence and co-chairs its annual Supreme Court Review program.  
This Article is based on a presentation given at the Twenty-Second Annual Leon D. Lazer 
Supreme Court Review held in Central Islip, New York on November 5, 2010.  The author 
expresses appreciation for the valuable assistance of the editors of the Touro Law Review in 
the preparation of this Article. 
1 See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010). 
2 S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976) (“All of these civil rights laws [referred to in 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1988] depend heavily upon private enforcement . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
3 Id. (stating that “[i]n many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must 
sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer”). 
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award attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party.4  Thus, a court may al-
low a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees from the defen-
dant.5  This is where the phrase “fee-shifting” comes from; meaning 
that if the plaintiff prevails, liability for the attorney’s fees will shift 
from the plaintiff to the defendant.6 
Overall, there are about 150 federal fee-shifting statutes.7  
These statutes include civil rights fee-shifting statutes,8 environmen-
tal statutes,9 fair housing statutes,10 consumer legislation,11 consumer 
lending,12 and ERISA.13  This Article will discuss the Civil Rights 
4  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2011) (stating that “[i]n any action or proceeding 
. . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”).  See the appendix to Justice Brennan’s opi-
nion in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting), for a list of 119 
fee-shifting statutes. 
5 A prevailing defendant may recover fees, but only when plaintiff’s suit was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or groundless.  See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 
(1978). 
6 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. 
7 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983) (stating that approximately 
150 federal fee-shifting statutes exist). 
8 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988; Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1997a(b) (West 2011); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(b) 
(West 2011). 
9 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(d) (West 2011); 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7622(e)(2) (West 2011). 
10 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(p) (West 2011). 
11 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(d) (West 2011) (“In the case of any successful action 
under [15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(a)-(c)], the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attor-
ney’s fee as determined by the court, shall be added to any damages awarded by the court 
under such subsection.”); 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(1)(B)(2) (West 2011) (“If a consumer final-
ly prevails in any action brought under [15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d)(1)], he may be allowed by 
the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and 
expenses (including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court 
to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commence-
ment and prosecution of such action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine that 
such an award of attorney’s fees would be inappropriate.”). 
12 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(3) (West 2011). 
13 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g)(1) (West 2011) (“In any action under [29 U.S.C.A. § 
1132] (other than an action described in paragraph (2)) by a participant, beneficiary, or fidu-
ciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to 
either party.”).  In determining when attorney’s fees should be granted under ERISA, courts 
have looked to five factors: 
(1) the degree of the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith; (2) the 
opposing party’s ability to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees; (3) the de-
terrent effect of an award on other persons under similar circumstances; 
(4) whether the party requesting fees sought to confer a common benefit 
on all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or resolve signifi-
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Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976,14 which is the most significant 
federal fee-shifting statut
II. ISSUES REGARDING FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES 
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976 provides 
that a court, in its discretion, may award a reasonable attorney’s fee 
to the prevailing party in the civil rights cases that are specified in 42 
U.S.C. § 1988.15  The phrase “in its discretion” contained in 
§ 1988(b), makes clear that an award of attorney’s fees is within the 
court’s discretion and is not mandated.16  The key statute specified in 
§ 1988 is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the federal statute that authoriz-
es individuals to bring suits to vindicate their federal constitutional 
rights against state officials, local officials, and municipalities.17  Of 
the more than 150 federal fee-shifting statutes, many are worded in a 
way that is similar to § 1988(b), and, therefore, are interpreted the 
same way.18  However, some fee-shifting statutes are worded diffe-
rently, and are subject to their own individualized interpretation.19 
In general, there are two reasons that federal fee-shifting sta-
cant legal questions regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the 
parties’ positions. 
Sec’y of Dep’t of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1985). 
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. 
15 Id. (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”). 
16 In fact, the wording of the statute has been classified as “provid[ing] the courts with 
almost unbridled discretion.” Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1303 (6th Cir. 
1991). 
17 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (enumerating 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 as one of the statutes in 
which a prevailing party may recover a reasonable attorney’s fee under the section).  Title 
42, Section 1983 of the United States Code states, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2011). 
18 See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1671 n.3 (“Virtually identical language appears in many of the 
federal fee-shifting statutes.”). 
19 See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010) (interpreting 
ERISA fee-shifting statute).  
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tutes have generated a tremendous amount of litigation.  The first rea-
son is that the stakes are often very high.20  In some cases, the defen-
dant’s fee liability may be substantially greater than his or her liabili-
ty on the merits.21  For example, in 1986, the United States Supreme 
Court, in a police misconduct case in which the plaintiffs recovered 
about $33,050 in money damages,22 upheld an attorney’s fee award 
of more than $245,000, which was about seven times greater than the 
damages award.23  In the Supreme Court case decided last Term, the 
federal district court’s fee award was $10.5 million, which certainly 
illustrates the potentially high stakes in statutory fee-shifting litiga-
tion.24 
The second reason there is a large volume of contentious liti-
gation under the fee-shifting statutes is that many of the terms in the 
20 See Gregory Scott Heier, City of Riverside v. Rivera, A Windfall for Civil Rights Attor-
neys, 66 NEB. L. REV. 808, 823-24 (1987) (underscoring the need for legislation requiring a 
clearer standard of the meaning of “reasonable” with respect to fee-shifting statutes to pre-
vent “overzealous attorneys” from “enrich[ing] themselves at the expense of the public”). 
21 See, e.g., Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1669-70 (noting that the district court awarded a $10.5 
million dollar award of attorney’s fees following a consent decree resolving all disputes); see 
also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 564-65 (1986) (noting that a jury awarded a 
plaintiff attorney’s fees that were seven times greater than the compensatory and punitive 
damages combined); Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 522, 523 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(noting that attorney’s fees of $20,000 was challenged as being out of proportion to an emo-
tional distress award of $15,000); Adorno v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F. Supp. 2d 507, 
510 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that over $765,000 in attorney’s fees was requested after the 
plaintiffs were awarded a total of slightly more than $101,000); Arnone v. CA, Inc., No. 08-
Civ.4458(SAS), 2009 WL 585841, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009) (recognizing that there 
was an award of $71,520.50 in attorney’s fees and $56,628.25 in damages). 
22 See Rivera, 477 U.S. at 564-65. 
23 Id. at 565.  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the district court in Rivera awarded the plain-
tiffs “reasonable” attorney’s fees in the amount of $245,465.25, but the defendants com-
plained that the fee award was not proportionate to the amount of damages.  Id. at 567.  Ul-
timately, the Supreme Court upheld the fee award, despite the fact that it was seven times 
greater than the sum of compensatory and punitive damages.  Id. at 581.  The Court stated: 
A rule that limits attorney’s fees in civil rights cases to a proportion of 
the damages awarded would seriously undermine Congress’ purpose in 
enacting § 1988.  Congress enacted § 1988 specifically because it found 
that the private market for legal services failed to provide many victims 
of civil rights violations with effective access to the judicial process. 
Id. at 576. 
24 See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1669-70.  In Perdue, a class action suit was filed against the 
Governor of Georgia and several officials on behalf of some three thousand foster care child-
ren who claimed deficiencies in the system.  Id.  After the district court approved a consent 
decree arrived at through mediation, the court awarded attorney’s fees of $10.5 million.  Id. 
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fee statutes give rise to difficult questions of interpretation.25  For ex-
ample, how should the Court exercise its discretionary authority?  
Who is a “prevailing party”?  What is a “reasonable” attorney’s fee? 
The prevailing party issue has given rise to some difficult is-
sues.  Two hypothetical examples illustrate this point.  In the first, a 
plaintiff brings a § 1983 constitutional claim against a city and a po-
lice officer and the jury renders a verdict finding a violation of the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights, but awards only one dollar in damag-
es.  The plaintiff then seeks $400,000 in attorney’s fees for litigating 
the case.  The Supreme Court has held that a civil rights plaintiff who 
recovers only nominal damages is a prevailing party, but normally a 
reasonable attorney’s fee under these circumstances is no fee or a 
very low fee.26   
Now let’s say the plaintiff and defendant settle a § 1983 case 
by settlement.  If the settlement culminates in a consent decree, that 
clearly qualifies the plaintiff as a prevailing party.  But, if instead the 
parties reach a purely private settlement, the plaintiff is not a prevail-
ing party and therefore not eligible for attorney’s fees, because the 
Supreme Court holds that judicial relief is required to qualify as a 
prevailing party.27 
There are two fairly recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
25 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (determining that the term “prevailing party” included a party that nei-
ther won on the merits nor secured a court-ordered consent decree, but in effect achieved the 
desired result by changing the defendant’s conduct; the Court held it did not); see also Tex. 
State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 784, 793 (1989) (noting a 
circuit split and holding that a party that prevails on significant issues in civil rights cases is 
a “prevailing party”); Perez v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 
2009) (“[I]n order to be considered a ‘prevailing party’ . . . , a plaintiff must not only achieve 
some material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties, but that change must also be 
judicially sanctioned.” (alteration in original) (quoting Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 79 
(2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. Bd. of Educ. of 
N.Y.C., 407 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the settlement of an administrative pro-
ceeding qualifies the prevailing plaintiffs as “prevailing parties” under the terms of the fee 
shifting statute). 
26 See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). 
27 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. at 604 n.7 (“We have subsequently 
characterized the Maher opinion as also allowing for an award of attorney's fees for private 
settlements.  But this dictum ignores that Maher only ‘held that fees may be assessed . . . af-
ter a case has been settled by the entry of a consent decree.’  Private settlements do not entail 
the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees.  And federal jurisdiction to 
enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the agree-
ment are incorporated into the order of dismissal.” (quoting Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 
720 (1986))). 
  
118 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
s fees. 
 
decisions where the plaintiffs’ relief under a settlement agreement sa-
tisfied the prevailing party requirement because the settlement culmi-
nated in a judicial order.28  In one case, the settlement was incorpo-
rated into an “Order of Settlement, Release and Stipulation of 
Discontinuance,” and qualified the plaintiff as a prevailing party.29  
In the second case, the settlement agreement was not incorporated in-
to the dismissal order, but the district court retained jurisdiction for 
the purpose of enforcing the settlement agreement, and again the 
plaintiff qualified as a prevailing party.30  From these two examples, 
it is easy to see why important litigation may well take place over the 
prevailing party issue.  These decisions illustrate that the manner in 
which a case is settled could well determine whether a plaintiff will 
receive attorney’
III. PERDUE V. KENNY A. EX REL. WINN 
Another major issue is how a court determines “a reasonable 
attorney’s fee.”  This question was addressed by the United States 
Supreme Court last Term in Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn.31  In 
Perdue, the plaintiffs brought a class action that alleged serious defi-
ciencies in Georgia’s foster care system.32  The case was litigated for 
eight years and the record was voluminous, with twenty boxes of le-
gal papers filed.33  The litigation eventually culminated in a consent 
decree which qualified the plaintiff as a prevailing party.34  The con-
sent decree was forty-seven pages, and it outlined thirty-one different 
28 See Perez, 587 F.3d 143; Roberson, 346 F.3d 75. 
29 See Perez, 587 F.3d at 144.  In Perez, a group of Muslim prisoners settled a lawsuit af-
ter the defendants agreed to its demands for Halal or Kosher meat.  Id.  The district court, in 
memorializing the settlement, awarded the plaintiffs attorney’s fees.  Id. 
30 See Roberson, 346 F.3d at 78.  In Roberson, a dismissal order that acknowledged the 
parties’ settlement, but stated only that the district court “ ‘shall retain jurisdiction over the 
settlement agreement for enforcement purposes,’ ” was challenged when the plaintiffs sought 
attorney’s fees.  Id.  The defendants claimed that the order of dismissal failed to state that the 
plaintiffs were the “prevailing parties,” and therefore, were not entitled to attorney’s fees.  
Id. 
31 130 S. Ct. 1662. 
32 Id. at 1669 (recognizing that 3000 children in foster care in two counties near Atlanta 
sued state government officials for injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorney fees and 
expenses). 
33 Id. at 1679 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
34 Id. at 1669-70 (majority opinion) (noting that the parties entered into a consent decree 
which settled all issues in the case, except for attorney’s fees). 
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requirements the State had to comply with in order to rectify the defi-
ciencies in its state foster care system.35 
Plaintiffs moved for statutory attorney’s fees under § 1988 in 
the federal district court, requiring the court to determine a reasona-
ble fee award.36  The district court judge used the “lodestar” method 
of multiplying the reasonable hours expended by plaintiffs’ attorneys 
on the case by the reasonable hourly rates.37  Of course, the parties 
might well disagree about what constitutes reasonable hours or 
rates.38 
The district judge in Perdue said that “based on its personal 
observation of plaintiffs’ counsel’s performance throughout this liti-
gation, the [c]ourt finds that the superb quality of their representation 
far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the standard 
hourly rates used to calculate the lodestar.”39  The district judge con-
tinued: 
[P]laintiffs’ counsel brought a higher degree of skill, 
commitment, dedication, and professionalism to this 
litigation than the [c]ourt has seen displayed by the at-
torneys in any other case during its [twenty-seven] 
years on the bench.  The foster children of Fulton and 
DeKalb Counties were indeed fortunate to have such 
unparalleled legal representation . . . .40 
Because the judge was so impressed with the legal services 
rendered by plaintiffs’ attorneys, he enhanced the lodestar amount by 
seventy-five percent, making the total fee award $10.5 million.41  The 
35 Id. at 1681 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
36 Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1670 (majority opinion).  See also Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Per-
due, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (stating that “one difficult issue remains: 
what is a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses to be awarded to plaintiffs’ 
counsel?”). 
37 See Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1272-73. 
38 See id. (explaining that there are factors that first must be determined by the court to 
reach the lodestar amount). 
39 Id. at 1288-89. 
40 Id. at 1289 (concluding that “the [c]ourt would be remiss if it failed to compensate 
counsel for this extraordinary level of service to their clients”). 
41 See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1670 (noting that the additional 75% added $4.5 million to the 
award); see also Kenny A., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (“[T]he [c]ourt conclude[d] that the lo-
destar should be adjusted upward by a multiplier of 1.75, resulting in a total fee award of 
$10,522,405.08.”). 
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Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award.42 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s fee 
award.43  The Supreme Court agreed that a reasonable fee should 
start with the lodestar amount, but also stated that determining a rea-
sonable fee should normally end with the lodestar.44  The Court rec-
ognized that district court judges have discretionary authority to en-
hance the lodestar amount for exceptional representation producing 
exceptional results, but only in rare and extraordinary cases.45  At the 
same time, the Supreme Court has never upheld such an enhance-
ment.46   
The justices were split five-to-four, with the conservative jus-
tices in the majority voting to overturn the seventy-five percent lodes-
tar enhancement.47  The majority found that the district judge’s en-
hancement of the lodestar, based upon the quality of representation 
producing exceptional results, failed to point to specific evidence that 
justified the enhancement.48  The district court must provide an ex-
planation and justification for an enhancement that is sufficiently 
specific to allow for meaningful appellate review.49  According to the 
majority, the district court failed to do so.50  By contrast, the dissent 
stressed the extraordinary results achieved by plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
and that appellate courts should defer to district court fee determina-
tions.51  
42 Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, 547 
F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008). 
43 Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1677. 
44 Id. at 1675. 
45 See id. at 1676.  The Court further explained that even though the district courts do pos-
sess this discretionary authority, it is not without limitation.  Id.  If this discretionary authori-
ty was without limitation, it is highly likely that the value of settlements awarded would be 
based on the judge’s subjective opinion of what the legal representation in question was 
worth.  Id.  As a result, prospective defendants seeking out enhancement fees would be devo-
id of a standard by which they could measure their prospective earnings, as awarded by the 
courts.  Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1676.  Moreover, as much of the attorney’s fees are in fact paid 
by the state and, essentially, the tax payers from which the matter arose, fees that should be 
allocated towards vital state programs would instead be allocated to subsidizing enhance-
ment fees potentially awarded by the courts.  Id. at 1676-77. 
46 See id. at 1673. 
47 See id. at 1669, 1676.  
48 Id. at 1676. 
49 See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1676. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 1679 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This case well illustrates why our tiered and 
functionally specialized judicial system places the task of determining an attorney's fee 
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The Supreme Court in Perdue strongly endorsed the lodestar 
approach.52  This is important because in 2007, the Second Circuit 
rejected the lodestar approach and attempted to institute an alterna-
tive “presumptively reasonable fee” approach that many found diffi-
cult to comprehend.53  Perdue now makes clear that the fee determi-
nation should start with the lodestar approach and, therefore, 
implicitly rejected the Second Circuit’s alternative 54
According to the majority in Perdue, the critical problem was 
award primarily in the district court's hands.  The plaintiffs' lawyers spent eight years inves-
tigating the underlying facts, developing the initial complaint, conducting court proceedings, 
and working out final relief. The District Court's docket, with over 600 entries, consists of 
more than 18,000 pages.  Transcripts of hearings and depositions, along with other docu-
ments, have produced a record that fills 20 large boxes.  Neither we, nor an appellate panel, 
can easily read that entire record.  Nor should we attempt to second-guess a district judge 
who is aware of the many intangible matters that the written page cannot reflect.”). 
52 See id. at 1669 (majority opinion). 
53 See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 493 F.3d 
110 (2d Cir. 2007).  The court in Arbor Hill stated: 
[T]he better course—and the one most consistent with attorney’s fees ju-
risprudence—is for the district court, in exercising its considerable dis-
cretion, to bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that we and oth-
er courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney’s 
fees in setting a reasonable hourly rate.  The reasonable hourly rate is the 
rate a paying client would be willing to pay.  In determining what rate a 
paying client would be willing to pay, the district court should consider, 
among others, the Johnson factors; it should also bear in mind that a rea-
sonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate 
the case effectively.  The district court should also consider that such an 
individual might be able to negotiate with his or her attorneys, using 
their desire to obtain the reputational benefits that might accrue from be-
ing associated with the case.  The district court should then use that rea-
sonable hourly rate to calculate what can properly be termed the “pre-
sumptively reasonable fee.” 
Id. at 117-18.  The twelve factors are: 
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; 
(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of 
the case; (5) the attorney’s customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is 
fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the 
circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results ob-
tained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) 
the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the profes-
sional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 
Id. at 114 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 
1974)).  See McDow v. Rosado, 657 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating that it is 
not obvious how Arbor Hill’s approach differs from the lodestar approach). 
54 See Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1672-73, 1675-76. 
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the district court judge’s failure to explain why seventy-five percent 
was selected as the enhancement.  In other words, the Supreme Court 
questioned why it was not fifty percent, twenty-five percent, or ten 
percent.55  As a result, the enhancement was reversed and the matter 
was remanded to the district court.56 
IV. SIMMONS V. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
There is another fee issue that directly affects attorneys who 
litigate fee issues governed by the precedent of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  The issue concerns the determination of the rea-
sonable hourly rate when attorneys with offices in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, where the hourly rates are relatively high, litigate 
a case in the Eastern District of New York, where the hourly rates are 
generally lower.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Simmons v. 
New York City Transit Authority,57 ruled that when the attorneys for 
the prevailing party have an office that is located in a different district 
from where the case is litigated, there is a strong presumption that the 
market rates of the forum govern.58  However, an exception exists if 
the plaintiff can show “that a reasonable client would have selected 
out-of-district counsel because doing so would likely (not just possi-
bly) produce a substantially better net result.”59 
This decision has caused some Eastern District judges to be 
resentful, arguing that the Eastern and Southern Districts should be 
viewed as one economic market because, after all, it is only one sub-
way stop away from lower Manhattan over the Brooklyn Bridge to 
get from the Southern District to the Eastern District.60  The Second 
55 Id. at 1675.  The Court explained that when a “judge awards an enhancement on an im-
pressionistic basis, a major purpose of the lodestar method—providing an objective and re-
viewable basis for fees—is undermined.”  Id. at 1676 (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 
505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992)). 
56 Id. at 1677. 
57 575 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2009). 
58 Id. at 172. 
59 Id.  “ ‘We . . . have strayed from [the forum] rule only in the rare case where the special 
expertise of non-local counsel was essential to the case, it was clearly shown that local coun-
sel was unwilling to take the case, or other special circumstances existed.’ ”  Id. at 175 (alte-
ration in original) (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d 
Cir. 1987)). 
60 See Luca v. Cnty. of Nassau, 698 F. Supp. 2d 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Gutman v. Klein, 
No. 03 Civ. 1570(BMC), 2009 WL 3296072 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2009) (“[T]he border be-
tween the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York is uniquely permeable. . . . Imposing 
  
2011] ATTORNEY’S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 123 
 
Circuit said: “The [defendant] should not be required to pay for a li-
mousine when a sedan could have done the job.”61  This statement 
caused resentment in some Eastern District judges because they 
viewed the statement as condescending.62  In response, Judge Frede-
rick Block in the Eastern District said “the [c]ourt has throughout the 
years presided over trials with Eastern District lawyers . . . who de-
served to drive in limousines, and has had trials with some Southern 
District lawyers who should have been driving clunkers.”63 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because the stakes are frequently high and the issues difficult, 
fee-shifting statutes have and will continue to generate a tremendous 
amount of litigation.  Perdue and Simmons serve as examples of im-
portant fee shifting litigations.  The fiscal incentive provided by fed-
eral fee-shifting statutes gives attorneys a personal stake in the out-
come of their cases and, in so doing, serves to promote rigorous 
enforcement of federal civil rights laws. 
 
the Simmons burden on litigants ignores the ‘geographic reality and its economic conse-
quences in New York City.’ ” (citations omitted)). 
61 Simmons, 575 F.3d at 177. 
62 See Mark Fass, Eastern District Judge Criticized as ‘Condescending’ Circuit’s Ap-
proach to Calculation of Attorney’s Fees, 243 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2010) (“ ‘In conjuring this meta-
phor, the circuit court presumably did not intend to suggest that there was a qualitative dif-
ference in the competency of counsel between the two districts, yet it regrettably may be 
perceived by lawyers whose offices are in the Eastern District as having a condescending 
tone,’ Judge Block wrote.”). 
63 Luca, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 300. 
